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 COMMENT ON EPSTEIN, "HOLDOUTS,
 EXTERNALITIES, AND THE SINGLE
 OWNER: ONE MORE SALUTE TO
 RONALD COASE"*
 PATRICIA DANZON
 University of Pennsylvania
 ICHARD EPSTEIN'S thoughtful and thought-provoking article is an ambi-
 tious attempt to provide a unified approach to the question of allocation
 of rights in a world of nonzero transactions costs. His central thesis is
 that "the choice of the legal rule, whether by social command or private
 trade-off, typically turns on a trade-off between two separate impedi-
 ments to complete contingent-state contracts. . . . The first of these is
 the problem of externalities. The second is the problem of holdouts...
 In my view, the purpose of all legal rules is to minimize the sum of the
 costs that are associated with these two forms of bargaining obstacles."1
 As Epstein acknowledges, externality and holdout problems have been
 extensively examined separately. His contribution is to point out their
 pervasiveness and, more important, their inverse relationship. "All im-
 perfections, then, come in only two basic forms. . . . The essential di-
 lemma is that often the effort to counteract one problem will only aggra-
 vate the other, for where both are present, they stand in an inverse
 relationship with each other."2 The reason is that if consent of affected
 parties is not required, externalities may occur. Externalities can be pre-
 vented by requiring consent of all affected parties, but only at the cost
 of creating the potential for holdouts.
 Faced with these potential costs, Epstein argues that courts should-
 * Presented at the John M. Olin Centennial Conference in Law and Economics at the
 University of Chicago Law School, April 7-9, 1992. The author is a Celia Moh Professor,
 Departments of Health Care Systems and Insurance, the Wharton School of the University
 of Pennsylvania.
 1 Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute
 to Ronald Coase, in this issue, at 557.
 2 Id.
 [Journal of Law & Economics, vol. XXXVI (April 1993)]
 ?1993 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/93/3601-0026$01.50
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 and apparently usually do-minimize the sum of the costs related to
 externalities and holdouts. This, he argues, is equivalent to applying a
 "single owner" test. The single owner would allocate resources in a way
 that maximizes value (ignoring distributional effects). When applying this
 test to situations of potential conflict between multiple parties when coop-
 eration between them is precluded, the mandate is to maximize the joint
 value of the resources, net of transactions costs.
 Epstein proceeds to a normative and positive analysis of various areas
 of property law related to "physical invasions," concluding in most cases
 that the common-law rules can be explained by his simple rules. The only
 limits to the reach of these principles in determining optimal rules arise
 from the limits of the insights provided by the single owner test. Epstein
 concludes, "In those cases in which a single owner test yields a unique
 result, then it is the one that should be followed by the legal system. Yet
 in those cases in which the single owner test does not yield clear results,
 then there will be no principle that will yield a decisive answer to the
 particular problem at hand."3
 Epstein's proposed rule-to minimize the sum of costs associated with
 externalities and holdouts-is offered as a salute to Ronald Coase. But
 at first sight, it seems at odds with Coase's basic message about the
 fundamental importance of defining property rights. Externalities presum-
 ably exist only where property rights are not defined, whereas holdouts
 arise where property rights are defined, as part of the process of determin-
 ing the price at which they will be transferred. Following Coase, it would
 seem that externalities are always the greater evil, as a general principle,
 since if rights are not defined, negotiations over the transfer of resources
 to their highest-valued use are unlikely even to get started. In fact, Ep-
 stein's discussion refers to situations in which rights are always defined:
 the comparison is between alternative allocations. Externalities arise
 when one party is entitled to take unilateral actions without the consent
 of other affected parties; holdouts arise where consent of all parties is
 required.
 Paraphrasing, the sole owner principle is equivalent to positing a utili-
 tarian (additive) social welfare function. An additional implicit assump-
 tion is that all individuals are risk neutral. The social objective then re-
 duces to maximization of the net value derived from the use of resources,
 which is the gross value minus the transactions costs of effecting the
 transfer to the highest-valued use. Thus, Epstein's rule is simply a rule
 for efficient resource allocation. The "externality" costs are deadweight
 3 Id. at 561.
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 costs from resource misallocation. With respect to the "holdout costs,"
 Epstein implicitly assumes that they are pure waste. A broader view of
 transactions and contracting costs would recognize that in a multiparty
 world, information may be imperfect. Transactions costs then include the
 costs of obtaining and transferring information about resource value in
 alternative uses.
 This is not a trivial extension since it introduces the possibility that,
 from an ex ante perspective, externalities may potentially be bilateral
 (that is, affect both parties) and hence that some transactions expendi-
 tures should be viewed as productive investments in information rather
 than pure deadweight loss, as implied by the term "holdout." The legal
 rule should be designed to encourage an efficient investment (by both
 parties where relevant) in information and transfer of property to higher-
 valued uses. If incremental rather than all-or-nothing changes are possi-
 ble, the social optimum requires that, at the margin, the "holdout" cost
 of additional information is just equal to the reduction in deadweight loss
 due to resource misallocation.
 Stated in this way, the problem of defining optimal rules to govern
 invasions of physical property is exactly analogous to the tort problem
 of designing optimal rules to govern personal injuries. The externality
 costs are the analog of the injury costs, the holdout or information costs
 are the analog of costs of precautions.4 Investing in information reduces
 the externality costs, just as investment in precautions reduces accident
 costs. Thus, the production framework first applied by Brown5 to the
 accident problem applies, to the broad range of contexts reviewed by
 Epstein, with minor modifications: output is now the increment in re-
 source value, inputs are information and other contracting inputs.
 Pursuing this analogy, assigning the right to the highest-valued user
 with no requirement of consent from the other party (for example, owner-
 ship of the cave to the owner of the mouth) is analogous to a rule of no
 liability. Requiring consent or compensation (or removal of the offending
 property in the case of encroachment) is analogous to strict liability.
 It is well known that these extreme liability rules lead to a first-best
 outcome only for "single activity" accidents, that is, in circumstances
 where efficient accident prevention requires care by only one party. Simi-
 larly, it can be shown that the extreme property rules are first best only
 in circumstances where one type of use is always superior. More gener-
 4 It is noteworthy that the transactions costs associated with generating information are
 here elevated to a major role, in contrast to the neglect that such costs typically receive in
 models of tort law.
 5 John P. Brown. Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1976).
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 ally, which use of a property generates the highest value depends on the
 circumstances; for example, it may sometimes be more efficient to assign
 ownership of a cave to the owner of the surface land above the cave
 rather than to the owner of the mouth. Thus, in the more general case,
 the external effects can go in either direction (as in bilateral accidents),
 and moral hazard or strategic behavior can also be bilateral. Efficiency
 requires some investment in information to discover the highest-valued
 use.
 The analogy between the property rights problem and the more familiar
 accident problem may be stated formally. Let Y and L denote the value
 of the resource to A and B, respectively, with Y > L. Let x and z denote
 investment by A and B, respectively, on negotiating and other activities
 related to transfer of resources between them. The cost per unit of x and
 z is $1. The probability that a resource is transferred to its highest-valued
 use (in this case A) is p(x, z). Let us assume that px > 0 and pz < 0; that
 is, x increases the probability of transfer, z decreases the probability, and
 so could be called holdout costs. Alternatively, z could affect the per-
 ceived value of the resource.
 The social welfare problem is to maximize the expected value of the
 resource, net of transactions costs:
 max SW = p(x, z)(Y - L) - x - z, (1)
 x, z
 where p can be interpreted as the frequency of transfer of resources to
 their highest-valued use.
 The first-order condition for the socially optimal level of x is
 px(z*)[Y - L] = 1. (2)
 Thus, investment in effecting transfer to use A should be incurred up to
 the point where the marginal transacting cost is just equal to the expected
 gain in increased value of output.
 The first-order condition for z is
 p(x*)[Y - L] = 1. (3)
 Adopting Epstein's assumption that B's negotiating effort is pure waste,
 that is, it is known that Y > L and hence that pz < 0, the optimal level
 of z (z*) is zero. In the more general case where z generates information
 about the value of the resource to B, the formulation of the problem is
 more complex and the optimal level of z is not zero.
 The issue is, What rights should be assigned to B? Epstein considers
 two basic alternatives: (a) the right is assigned to A (presumptively the
 highest-valued use) with no consent or compensation requirement, which
 590
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 06 Jun 2016 20:16:25 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 COMMENT
 is analogous to the tort rule of no liability, or (b) B's consent (or, by
 implication, full compensation) is required, which is analogous to strict
 liability.
 As in the tort case, these extreme rules generally do not assure a first-
 best outcome. Consider first the analog of "no liability," whereby A is
 not required to compensate B, that is, any externality is permitted. A
 selects x to maximize his private interest PWA:
 max PWA = p(x, z)Y - x. (4)
 The first-order condition is
 Px(0)Y= 1. (5)
 Comparing equation (5) with equation (2), it is clear that if A is not
 required to compensate B, A invests in transfer activity to the point
 where the marginal transfer cost is equal to the expected gross gain,
 ignoring the loss to B. Thus, the allocation of resources to A-type uses
 is too high. Since B would have no incentive to invest in z, there would
 be no expenditure on holdouts but also no transfer of information about
 the loss incurred by B.
 Alternatively, under the analog of strict liability, A is required to com-
 pensate B or remove any encroachment. B has incentives to spend on z
 to increase the perceived value of L = L + dL(z). When B is entitled to
 compensation, his incentive is to maximize his expected compensation,
 net of negotiation costs:
 max PWB = p(x)(L + dL(z)) - z. (6)
 z
 The first-order condition is
 p(x)dLz = -1. (7)
 Thus, if the potential payoff to z is positive (Lz > 0), B invests in z to
 increase his expected compensation. This is the holdout problem. A's
 private objective function is
 max PWA = p(x, z)[Y - L - dL(z)] - x, (8)
 with first-order condition
 p,[Y- L - dL(z)] = 1. (9)
 This would be socially optimal only if dL = z = 0. But if z > 0 because
 B "holds out" for higher compensation by exaggerating his true value of
 L, then the transfer of resources to A-type uses will be suboptimal.
 Thus, a rule that requires full compensation or no compensation is
 591
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 never first-best optimal if both sides have incentives to spend resources,
 A on increasing the probability (frequency) of transfer and B on increas-
 ing his expected compensation from the transfer.
 Consider first the choice of optimal rule when only these all-or-none
 rules are possible. The rule requiring no consent or compensation of B
 by A leads to a first best only if A's use imposes no externality on B; if
 this condition is not met, then the optimal rule depends on the extent of
 moral hazard by both sides, which depends on Px and Lz. A rule of no
 consent is the solution that Epstein advocates for caves: assign all rights
 to the owner of the mouth, none to the owner(s) of the surface land over
 the cave. But if A's use of the cave imposes externalities on B, for exam-
 ple, due to subsidence or disturbance of surface land, and the supply of
 caves is not perfectly inelastic, there will be too many caves and too
 much interference with surface owners' rights.
 By contrast, in the case of encroachments, Epstein assumes an elastic
 supply of encroachments (px is high) and therefore opts for the other
 extreme rule of assignment of all rights to B. However, like strict liability,
 this rule also leads to first-best outcomes only in restrictive circum-
 stances. As Epstein points out, a rule requiring full compensation or
 removal of encroachments is more likely to be optimal if the supply of
 encroachments is highly elastic. However, the elasticity of supply of z
 and the productivity of z in raising L are also factors to be considered.
 Potentially efficient transfers will be abandoned if seller demands (L +
 dL(z)) are sufficiently large to eliminate all expected return to A, net of
 compensation and own bargaining expense:
 p(x)[Y - L - dL(z)] - x - 0. (10)
 Presumably, this is unlikely in the two-person bilateral monopoly case.
 But the likelihood that transactions costs block a value-increasing trans-
 fer increases as the number of sellers increases, conditional on the aggre-
 gate value of L. In that case, each seller can hold out for the total increase
 in value due to the transfer, and the sum6 of these maximum demands
 exceeds Y. Thus, ceteris paribus, as the number of sellers increases,
 holding constant the aggregate value to the buyer, the expected holdout
 costs increase, and the rule requiring unanimous consent becomes in-
 creasingly less likely to be even a second best.
 As in the case of tort liability for accidents, circumstances are often
 such that there is no rule that universally dominates: externalities may
 flow in both directions, and optimal investment in negotiations to deter-
 6 For a discussion of this rationale for eminent domain, see Patricia Danzon, An Eco-
 nomic Analysis of Eminent Domain (1976).
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 mine the highest-valued use is nonzero. As with accidents that require
 bilateral "care," first-best allocations of property resources may require
 more complex rules. The analog of strict liability with a contributory
 negligence defense would be that A should compensate B only if z = z*;
 that is, B does not exaggerate or act strategically to obstruct the transfer.
 The analog of negligence with a contributory negligence defense would
 be that A should compensate B if A invests unreasonably (x > x*), pro-
 vided that B did not behave strategically (z = z*). Simple negligence
 would just drop the condition on z.
 These rules place higher information requirements on the courts than
 the simple all-or-nothing rules. They require the courts to determine
 whether A has engaged in moral hazard or B has acted strategically with
 exaggerated demands for compensation. But the information required to
 choose between the two simple rules is not trivial-Epstein's assertions
 to the contrary notwithstanding.
 The analogy between optimal rules for property invasions and optimal
 rules for accidents may be extended further. Just as efficient accident
 prevention often requires conditions on the rate of harmful activities by
 both parties and on the care per unit of activity,7 similarly, efficient allo-
 cation of property requires conditions on both ownership and the fre-
 quency or extent of use. For example, even if ownership of caves is
 optimally assigned to the owner of the mouth, efficiency may require
 some restrictions on use, if some uses inflict costs on surface owners. It
 would be a simple matter to extend the formal model to include these
 additional dimensions. But the conclusion, as in the tort case, is likely to
 be that simple rules are even less likely to lead to first-best outcomes,
 once the multidimensional and bilateral nature of the interactions is taken
 into account.
 In my discussion, I have intentionally used the terminology of effi-
 ciency rather than the single owner. In multiparty conflicts, the single
 owner terminology begs the question of whose preferences this owner
 adopts if the preferences of the parties differ. Thus, the single owner
 principle is unambiguous only in circumstances in which preferences are
 similar and wealth effects of property right assignment are small. More
 generally, the allocation of rights affects the distribution of wealth, and
 this in turn may affect the valuation of alternative resource allocations.
 For example, if the surface owner were assigned the right to the cave,
 the highest-valued use might be to leave it undeveloped, if he values very
 highly the privacy and tranquility that is destroyed when it is exploited
 7 Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980).
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 for tourism. The assignment of ownership to the owner of the mouth of
 the cave would create, not eliminate, a holdout problem since now the
 surface owner would have to negotiate to acquire the right to eliminate
 tourism. This underscores the more general point, that the value-
 maximizing use of a resource may itself depend on the distribution of
 rights. Thus, it may be circular to look to value maximization to deter-
 mine the optimal distribution of rights, where this distribution has wealth
 effects that in turn affect the overall value of resources.
 If wealth effects are negligible, then net wealth maximization is either
 always or never the correct criterion to apply in principle, depending on
 the structure of the social welfare function. The obstacles to its applica-
 tion in practice are the empirical difficulties of determining the relevant
 costs and benefits. This ambiguity may hold more generally than Epstein
 acknowledges. Thus, whereas Epstein envisages two sets of circum-
 stances, those that can and those that cannot be resolved unambiguously
 by appeal to the single owner principle, I believe that wealth maximiza-
 tion is in principle always applicable but that empirical difficulties may
 preclude clear-cut answers in many cases. In other words, the informa-
 tion requirements for determining the optimal rule vary among contexts,
 but are rarely zero or infinite, as Epstein's dichotomy implies. Of course,
 Epstein may dismiss more complex rules as hopelessly costly to imple-
 ment. That is a judgment about which reasonable people may differ.
 Empirical hunches about the efficiency of alternative legal rules are, like
 beauty, often in the eye of the beholder.
 In summary, Epstein has proposed a useful unifying framework for
 evaluating the efficiency of alternative property rules. I believe that more
 careful theoretical and empirical analysis is required in order to substanti-
 ate the normative conclusions preferring certain rules over others and
 the positive conclusions that actual rules conform to these normative
 prescriptions. This is in no way a criticism of Epstein's framework;
 rather, it is a call for extending and developing it.
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